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ABSTRACT
In a fresh twist on early incorporation of cybersecurity engineering, SSC Pacific is embarking on a 5-year small
satellite capability development effort for the U.S. Navy. One of the key objectives is to infuse cybersecurity
methodologies, technologies, and tools into each phase of the small-satellite life-cycle, from concept design to
operations. In this first year, we report out progress to develop a new nanosatellite integration and test laboratory
environment that incorporates cybersecurity into every step. The effort leverages technologies and lessons learned
from ongoing U.S. Navy-funded research and development of tools and systems for securing commercial
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Industrial Control Systems (ICS). The paper
describes the nanosatellite integration environment being developed at SSC Pacific, along with our approach to
overlaying cyber security design and testing into the small satellite acquisition lifecycle. Lessons learned from
SCADA/ICS cybersecurity research are then described, along with description of cybersecurity tools and methods
applicable to small satellites. Finally, ongoing cybersecurity testing of a Beagle Bone Black processor is described,
along with initial findings and comments about how to harden the processor against cyberattack.

• Internet protocol (IP) architectures. Net-centric
architectures aid system accessibility, modularity and
integration, but also expand the cyberattack surface.

LIFECYCLE CYBERSECURITY FOR SMALL
SATELLITES
Small satellite development costs are trending
downward, but cybersecurity complexity and costs are
trending upward. The same commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) technologies and modular, open-network
architectures that promise low-cost, rapid development
also come with a potentially heavy cybersecurity price
tag. This is especially true for small military satellite
programs, which are striving to achieve high mission
assurance without killing off the culture of innovation,
rapid development, and low cost that makes small
satellites desirable in the first place.

• Increased automation within ground and satellite
systems. Automation aids in on-orbit processing and
reduced operational costs, but adds cybersecurity
complexity.
The challenges call for lifecycle cybersecurity
management solutions, but this is a serious difficulty
for small satellite integrators who intentionally do not
want to own (or pay for) complete supply chain
management of every cable, processor chip, and line of
code. Rapid technology prototyping and insertion
requires the ability to cobble together busses, payloads,
and components into plug and play network
architectures using standard interfaces and protocols.

Cybersecurity challenges often faced by small satellite
programs include:
• Cyber security risks inherent in COTS computer
processors and software. Vulnerabilities may be more
difficult to assess due to proprietary software and
designs, but patches to known vulnerabilities may be
commercially available.

This paper develops an approach to lifecycle
cybersecurity that makes use of lifecycle steps the
integrator does control, and applies the strategic use of
both
commercial
and
government-developed
vulnerability assessment tools to drive down the risks
inherent in low cost COTS-based procurement and
integration. The lessons are focused toward the
government integrator, but applicable to integrators in
industry and academia as well.

• Increased reliance on large software libraries (both
free/open and vendor provided). Open source libraries
can aid software modularity, but fully investigating the
potential vulnerabilities can take significant time and
resources.
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specialized payloads for military applications and test
rapid response small satellite capacities for warfighter.
The approach is to build a complete small satellite
research and development environment, supporting
design, modeling and simulation, prototype fabrication,
test and evaluation, and operations. The environment
will include basic in-house facilities for integration and
testing, as well as access to specialized outside facilities
and contracts for commercially-procured supplies and
components. (Figure 1).

ACTION LABORATORY ENVIRONMENT
SSC Pacific has launched a 5-year capability
development
effort
to
infuse
cybersecurity
methodologies, technologies, and tools into each phase
of the small-satellite life-cycle, from concept design, to
COTS procurement, to operations.
This cyber
technology initiative is part of a larger initiative to
establish a nationally recognized government
nanosatellite integration capability, enabling SSC
Pacific to integrate small satellite buses with

Figure 1: SSC Pacific Accelerated Capability for Integration and Testing of Nanosats (ACTION) Laboratory
environment will enable the U.S. Navy to prototype innovative small satellite technologies to meet urgent
warfighter needs, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), position, navigation, and time
(PNT), ocean sensing, and assured communications.

assess cyber vulnerabilities, through analysis and
testing, at the lowest level possible as early as possible.
Mitigations are then implemented as part of the system
integration.

CYBERSECURITY OVERLAY
The SSC Pacific ACTION Lab approach to small
satellite cybersecurity is to make maximum use of the
small satellite lifecycle portions where the integrator
has control. These include, in most cases, the following
lifecycle steps:
• Concept design
• Payload and subsystem development and fabrication
• Bus, payload and ground subsystem acceptance and
testing
• System-level integration and testing
• Launch, on-orbit operation, and maintenance

Within every step life-cycle of a satellite, from design
to operations, we aim to blend cybersecurity objectives,
tools, and activities into other mission assurance
activities. Process time is then conserved by planning
information assurance and mission assurance
milestones in step with physical and software system
milestones. Cyber testing activities are dovetailed with
physical and software testing activities. Cybersecurity
functions and staff are integrated with the other mission
assurance functions and staff. (Table 1).

Where the integrator does not have direct control, such
as COTS-component development and commercial
interface adaptation, our approach is to aggressively
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placed on the potential of malformed input sent through
sensors to inject logic into a bus in its many forms [1,
2]. These steps enable early incorporation of
mitigations and controls, including effective antitampering and active defense mechanisms, which are
very costly to add later.

Table 1: SSC Pacific ACTION laboratory
environment inserts cybersecurity objectives and
risk reduction measures into each phase of the small
satellite development lifecycle
Lifecycle Phase

Cybersecurity Overlay

Concept design

Survey HW/SW vulnerabilities
Plan security controls

Payload and
subsystem
development

Incorporate security code and controls
Graybox and blackbox testing of
subsystem interfaces

Bus, payload and
ground subsystem
acceptance

Static-dynamic analysis of payloads,
buses
Reverse engineering of subsystems and
protocols

System-level
integration and
testing

Dynamic analysis and testing of
communications interfaces, signals
interference, interception, and injection

Launch, on-orbit
operation, and
maintenance

Monitor and defend network health

At the system-level integration and testing phase, we
perform dynamic analysis and testing of individual subsystems prior to integrating components into a larger
system. As each subsystem is integrated, we employ
blackbox-testing techniques for discovery of emergent
properties within the integrated system. This type of
dynamic analysis aids in the discovery previously
hidden vulnerabilities, leading to system hardening and
vulnerability mitigation.
At the launch, on-orbit operation, and maintenance
phase, cyber testing is expanded to include ground
station devices and software used to manage and
communicate with satellites on-orbit. The full spectrum
attack methodology followed for the satellite testing is
applied to the ground station devices, operating
systems, and software. Security controls and defense
mechanisms must be incorporated into ground station
system (i.e. anti-tampering, logging & reporting, etc.),
including possible development of new active defensive
capabilities. Continued monitoring of the embedded
anti-tamper and defensive features within the
nanosatellite should also be performed, with a focus onground system defense and on-orbit system protection.

The concept design phase is a critical point to build
cybersecurity controls into the entire system from the
beginning. A survey of the commercially available
devices that meet the functional requirements of the
satellite mission is required, in order to select COTS
solutions with the best security controls and support.
Next, a thorough investigation of known vulnerabilities
used against the proposed list of COTS hardware and
software should be executed. An integrated report of
findings from both the hardware and software attack
vectors should be compiled into recommendations to
ensure that security controls & defense mechanisms are
designed into the base system.

NAVY SCADA/ICS RESEARCH
Our small satellite cybersecurity approach leverages
technologies and lessons learned from ongoing U.S.
Navy-funded research and development of tools and
systems for securing commercial Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Industrial
Control Systems (ICS). The research is relevant as
SCADA and ICS components are often found in
applications similar to satellite platforms and space
networks [3]. The goal of this research is to develop a
framework that enables the proper and efficient
evaluation of technologies for securing networks for
various industrial government applications [4]. SCADA
and ICS networks allow digital input from computing
components, which might be thousands of miles away,
to control physical assets such as motors, actuators,
pumps, radios, etc. The problem is that the unprotected
nature, interconnected paradigm, and global footprint of
SCADA networks make them extremely vulnerable to
cyber-attack.

At the payload and subsystem development stage we
ensure that proper secure coding practices are followed
during any development of interfaces or “glue code”.
Whitebox testing, such as static code analysis, should
be performed to avoid common programing pitfalls like
memory corruption, arithmetic boundaries, type
conversions, string handling, among other errors.
Graybox and blackbox testing of software interfaces
should be performed, including, if needed, development
of custom software for dynamic testing of interfaces
and protocols. Each of these steps requires a thorough
understanding of the subsystems involved and may
require reverse engineering of subsystems or protocols
used in proprietary technologies.
At the bus, payload and ground subsystem acceptance
phase, we introduce fuzz-testing of software-based
environmental controls, including possible development
of custom hardware and/or software for reverse
engineering of sensor logic. Special attention should be
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As part of the of SCADA/ICS cybersecurity work, SSC
Pacific has developed and continues to expand the
following lab capabilities [5]:
• Evaluation capabilities (software tools) that enable
streamlined
evaluation
of
SCADA
security
technologies, including security metrics, which provide
a granular decomposition of how well current security
technologies secure SCADA networks and its
components.
• A laboratory environment to baseline a sample
SCADA network (with real SCADA equipment) and
explore current SCADA vulnerabilities.
• A collaborative environment that enables the
sharing/reuse of Cyber SCADA knowledge and test
results.

those requirements. Security is often sprinkled in at the
end, leading to bolt-on solutions lacking cohesion
instead of designing the system with security in mind
from the start.

The approach provides not only the process necessary
to determine if a certain technology meets security
needs, but also provides the metrics to measure how
well those needs are met, and a framework to enable the
comparison of multiple technologies of interest.

• Reliance on proprietary protocols and proprietary
software for critical operations

In our work with SCADA and ICS security, we
frequently run into the following hurdles, many of
which are also relevant to small satellite security:
• Devices and processes are not designed with
cybersecurity in mind
• Systems will run for a very long time, far beyond
vendor support availability
• Software updates and patching can be difficult, and
slow in implementation

• Hardware is constrained in terms of memory & CPU
specs
• Presence of dissimilar hardware across large processes
(and need for interoperability)

There are some important differences between
SCADA/ICS information assurance and traditional
information assurance, particularly in the areas of risks
and priorities [6]. For example, many ICS require timecritical operations, where the focus is not on
throughput, but rather assurance of timely relaying of
messages within the system. Availability is a critical
ICS property, particularly while the potential for
physical damage or injury from service failure exists.
As a result some common practices, such as re-booting
systems when errors occur, cannot be applied to the ICS
environment. ICS environments frequently prioritize
availability over confidentiality and integrity, which
increases the likelihood of security flaws [7].

• Due to hardware constraints, standard vulnerability
assessments can break or disable devices
• Devices designed to be air-gapped or inter-connect
with private corporate networks, rather than on
enterprise networks or the Internet
• Systems have not been security tested, thus are easily
compromised due to large attack surface
• Community is apprehensive to current cybersecurity
approaches to critical systems due to concerns of
introducing new security vulnerabilities.
• In some instances, the thought of learning penetration
testing techniques is seen as irrelevant, or possibly
harmful, to securing industrial control networks

Approaching security from the “ground up” rather than
addressing security as an add-on, is a key goal. ICS
security approaches directly relate to small satellite
cybersecurity, as availability and dependability are also
often at direct odds with security. Furthermore, the
efforts described in this paper are also trying to bring
cybersecurity to the forefront of nanosatellite efforts, as
we have done with SCADA and ICS efforts,

• Lack of manpower that understands both industrial
control systems and cybersecurity
In application to small satellite systems, many of the
above-mentioned hurdles with SCADA/ICS systems
share relevance. As such, we propose employing a
layered approach to securing small satellite systems, in
a similar manner as we employ with SCADA/ICS.
Securing each layer starts at the hardware level, and
then moves up the architecture stack into the firmware,
operating system, application, and network levels. At
each stage, we employ a holistic attack methodology to
uncover and mitigate potential vulnerabilities early in
the system development. Our approach includes
implementing security controls and mitigations for each
discovered vulnerability and then applying preventative
controls at each layer. Controls we employ include

ICS METHODOLOGY FOR SATELLITES
For SCADA/ICS systems, the standard information
assurance paradigm of confidentiality, integrity and
availability [8] often flips into a prioritization paradigm
of availability, integrity and then confidentiality [9]. As
such, many of the “expected” security controls are
simply not available in the SCADA/ICS realm.
Systems have been designed with process requirements
in mind, however cybersecurity is often not one of
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hardening the operating system stack, correcting
common misconfigurations, unnecessary services,
unused protocols, and superfluous kernel support for
non-mission essential capabilities, among others.

have been analyzed, as well as analysis of captured
traffic to extract an understanding of the amount of
information leaked out through external interfaces.
This gives us an understanding of what an attacker
would be able to gather in the reconnaissance stage of
an attack. For the most part the BBB system-under-test
(SUT) performed well in this area, as limited
information was gleaned through this type of external
recon scans.

SCADA/ICS TOOLS FOR SATELLITES
Some of the capabilities that we are developing in our
nanosatellite cyber lab involve transitioning tools and
lessons learned from our SCADA/ICS work.
Capabilities such as vulnerability discovery and
assessments through use of tools such as the DoDmandated Assured Compliance Assessment Solution
(ACAS) scanner that incorporate custom scripts to aid
in the assessment without compromising the availability
of the overall system.

Next the operating BBB system stack was evaluated for
known vulnerabilities, as well as against attack vectors
used against similar Linux-base environments. The
kernel was tested and various attack scenarios were
exercised against the SUT. This proved to be a more
fertile ground for exploitation, as the common practice
of securing the external interfaces, but not hardening
the system internally was found to be the case for this
particular SUT. Various recommendations were
developed to harden the kernel and internal
configurations of the operating system to achieve a
more effective defense-in-depth approach to securing
this particular BBB implementation.

Essential tools include the ability to discover and
exercise vulnerabilities, develop custom exploits, and
perform general network penetration testing using tools
such as Kali Linux and Metasploit. Equally important
is gaining a better understanding of any proprietary
software, as well as an understanding of possible
missuses of executable code for which source code is
not available.

Further cybersecurity testing of the hardware, firmware
and application level software are still underway. Once
the results from these test are completed, they will be
included in future publications.

Disassemblers such as IDA Pro can aid in this type of
analysis. Hardware hacking techniques can provide a
better understanding of the underlying hardware and
how underlying vulnerabilities might be used by an
attacker to gain access to the software stack. Firmware
analysis and binary analysis are also used for inspecting
the underlying embedded software running on the
COTS and identifying unexpected interfaces or
backdoors. Tools such as the Sophia SCADA
monitoring tool [10] are being explored to help solve
the continued monitoring aspect of space cybersecurity
at the ground stations.

CONCLUSIONS
Cybersecurity costs cannot be avoided, but with
methodical application of the right tools to the right
risks at the right time in the lifecycle, we are building
an approach for lifecycle security and assurance into
our small satellite systems and ground architectures
with a goal to minimize reactive actions and costs. We
have shared how ongoing work in the SCADA/ICS
realm can be applied to gain insight into the small
satellite world, as well as provide capabilities that can
be customized to secure small satellite systems and
ground stations.

LESSONS FROM BEAGLE BONE BLACK
Due to low cost and rapid programmability, Advanced
RISC Machine (ARM) processors are increasing in
popularity for use in small satellite systems. In order to
better assess the cybersecurity risks of using ARMs in
small satellites, the SSC Pacific ACTION Lab team has
been investigating cyber vulnerabilities and risk
mitigations for the Beagle Bone Black (BBB) ARM
processor.
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